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Abstract
This paper looks at Texas tort law reform to make claims regarding the
relationship between Texas tort reform and damages recovered. Starting with reform in
1977, Texas has passed 15 pieces of legislation that, in principle, restrict the damages
plaintiffs recover. Most empirical analyses have focused primarily on analyzing behavior
resulting from the tort reform. In other cases, research has looked at the impact the most
recent reform has had on damages recovered in medical malpractice lawsuits. This paper
is the first to study the impact of Texas tort law reform on damages recovered while
looking at the entirety of recent law reform in the state. Specifically, I test the impact of
the 15 different laws on total allocated loss, economic loss, and noneconomic loss
recovered in all cases from 1988-2012. My findings suggest that caps on medical liability
damages are successful at decreasing damages recovered when the cap is geared at either
noneconomic damages, or a total damage figure that excludes punitive damages. This
suggests that future caps on medical liability damages should explicitly cap either
economic or noneconomic damages. Next, the results imply that caps on punitive damage
legislature were most successful when using specific value caps paired with an evidence
standard—caps of this nature decreased total damages by 28% in 1987 and 85% in 1995.
Finally, an introductory legislation restricting the use of joint and several liability in cases
when plaintiffs had little guilt was successful, it decreased total damages by 18.6%. This
was followed by three failed attempts to impact the application of joint and several
liability where the guilt threshold was higher, suggesting that joint and several liability is
rarely used if the plaintiff has substantial guilt.
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I. Introduction
There is a contentious debate regarding the ideal role tort law should play in each
state. In particular, with sharp increases in health care costs, many look to tort law as a
potential avenue for controlling the rising costs. Historically, the adoption of reform has
been motivated as a way for the government to regulate costs at a state level. As a result,
some legislation has capped damages paid, along with restricting scenarios in which a
lawsuit can be filed. The question is whether or not the state level tort law reform
succeeds at reducing payments in the tort system. By looking in depth at reform within
Texas and the subsequent damages recovered, we have the opportunity to test the impact
of these laws. While previous literature looks at behavior after reform, along with
assessing the impact of the most recent Texas tort reform on medical malpractice lawsuits
and corresponding payouts, this paper looks at the impact of the comprehensive recent
history of tort reform and the impact those laws have on damages recovered.
Tort law in Texas is known for aggressive conservative measures geared at
protecting defendants’ rights and limiting the damages plaintiffs can recover. Starting
with reform in 1977, Texas has passed 15 pieces of legislation that, in principle, restrict
the damages plaintiffs recover. For the most part, the law reforms fall into three
groupings—laws that limit recoverable damages in medical liability cases, caps on
punitive damages, and restricting the application of joint and several liability. Texas’
aggressive history of reform has given the state the label of “the tort reform state.”
(LeMance 2015).
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Most existing research focuses on the behavioral reaction to the changing laws. In
particular, the most recent reform capping damages in medical liability cases has shifted
the number of health care physicians in the state. Research shows that since the most
aggressive medical liability reform in 2003 capping total damages, the number of
physicians entering the state has increased by an average of 770 physicians each year
compared to nine years prior (“10 Years of Tort Reform” 2013). Other research shows
that since the reform, less money has been spent on defensive medicine—medicine
doctors use to safeguard against a medical malpractice lawsuit. The report draws
connections between the number of tort law reforms in each state and its negative
relationship with health care costs (Hiltzik 2014). Some research contends that there is no
evidence that the reform impacts health care costs (Paik et al., 2012).
However, there is little existing research that looks at the potential causal
relationship between Texas tort law reform and damages rewarded. With tort law, doctors
are inclined to engage in defensive medicine to ensure they don’t get sued (Hiltzik 2014).
Some doctors may even leave a state to avoid a lawsuit (“10 Years of Tort Reform”
2013). The point of tort law reform is to undo these effects. In order for this to work, it
follows that the payouts for plaintiffs are going to be lower. Has the reform succeeded at
significantly impacting the size of damages recovered? While previous literature has
briefly discussed the relationship between the 2003 noneconomic damage cap and
payouts in medical malpractice cases (Hyman 2009), how has the entire recent history of
Texas tort reform impacted damages recovered. This report studies the empirical
relationship between Texas tort law reform and damages recovered in order to evaluate
whether or not the legislature makes any meaningful impact. At the end of this report, I
2

am able to contribute meaningful evidence regarding the effectiveness of state level tort
law reform in impacting payouts.
I estimate each law reform’s effect on total allocated loss, economic loss, and
noneconomic loss using the Texas Department of Insurance Closed Claim Survey. The
Texas Department of Insurance Closed Claim Survey has expansive closed claim data on
225,791 observations beginning in 1988 and ending in 2012. In order to minimize
multicollinearity, the law reforms that exist for the same period of time are grouped
together into a single law reform variable. From this, the 15 law reforms are grouped into
ten law reform variables. It’s also important to note that multiple of these law groupings
overlap in years because multiple laws exist during a specific year within 1988-2012. By
controlling for injury type, policy type, yearly trends, and other law reforms, I am able to
make objective conclusions on each law reform variable’s impact on total allocated loss,
economic loss, and noneconomic loss. Furthermore, in looking at the impact on each
policy type, I can infer whether or not a law primarily impacts a specific area sector. For
the remainder of this paper, I will refer to the different sectors as policy types.
In order to help organize the results and make claims regarding the impact of each
law theme, the results section of this paper is organized into three sections—caps on
medical liability damages, caps on punitive damages, and joint and several liability
reform.
My findings for the first section suggest that the law reforms that cap damages in
medical liability cases have mixed results. The first two reforms were passed in 1977 and
are split in their effectiveness. The results suggest that a cap on total damages in medical
3

liability claims can have a substantial impact on economic and noneconomic damages,
but if punitive damages are included in the total damages calculation, there is no
perceived impact. In 2003, nearly 30 years later, a final law reform grouping geared at
more effectively restricting damages in medical liability cases was passed. The results
suggest that this reform succeeded at decreasing noneconomic damages by almost 10%.
From this, we can infer that the influx of doctors into Texas post 2003 is consistent with
the decreasing damages recovered. The success of this final law suggests that capping
noneconomic damages specifically is an effective way to impact payouts within medical
malpractice cases. Finally, my results suggest that the cap on noneconomic damages in
medical liability cases created a culture of decreasing damages that pervaded into other
policy types.
The second section of law reforms was aimed at capping punitive damages over
time. After a failed attempt in 1973, a new legislation was passed in 1987 that
successfully decreased total allocated loss by 28%. This lasted until 1995, when a
Republican controlled legislature instituted a more restrictive reform that decreased total
allocated loss by more than 85%. Taken together, my results suggest that after the first
failed attempt, Texas legislators became more aware of the nature of punitive damage
lawsuits in terms of size and ideal threshold of guilt, and as a result have succeeded at
decreasing punitive damages over time.
Finally, the last section of reforms restricts the application of joint and several
liability. Our findings imply that the first legislation with this aim succeeded in
decreasing total damages by 18.6%. However, the following three joint and several
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liability reforms result in no meaningful decrease to damages. While potential
multicollinearity exists for these variables, our results do imply that Texas legislators
were able to account for most joint and several liability applications in an introductory
constraint, and were able to successfully limit damages recovered.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides background information on
tort law in Texas, the different kinds of damages in tort law, and previous research
looking at Texas tort law reform. Section III highlights the data sources used. Section IV
describes the empirical specification for our analysis along with laying out the
organization of how our results are specified. Section V illustrates our results and
implications for these findings. Finally section VI offers a conclusion and possible
suggestions for future study.
II. Background
II.A. The Tort Reform State
The size and significance of Texas reform over the last twenty years has earned it
the name of “the tort reform state” (LeMance 2015). See Table 1 in Appendix for a
detailed description of the notable reform since 1987 complied by Ronen Avraham at the
University of Texas School of Law (Avraham 2014). The majority of the reform limits
the damages plaintiffs can recover.
The debate over whether or not the significant tort law reform has a positive
impact on Texas is incredibly contentious. It is worth noting that while the reform does
span across multiple types of law, there is a substantial portion (especially some of the
5

more recent reform) that is specifically geared towards medical malpractice cases.
Advocates of the reform argue that it both encourages an influx of doctors into the state
and decreases the dollars spent on defensive medicine. Since some of the most aggressive
medical malpractice reform in 2003, the state has licensed on average 3,134 new
physicians a year. This is nearly 770 more physicians when compared with the average
nine years prior. This suggests that the significant reform encouraged doctors to work in
Texas (“10 Years of Tort Reform” 2013). In addition to the influx of doctors, the new
reform decreases the defensive medicine that is infamous for increasing health care costs.
Defensive medicine is defined as any unnecessary treatment or service health care
physicians perform in order to mitigate the potential of a medical malpractice lawsuit. In
a study led by Michael Rothberg at the Cleveland Clinic and published in the Journal of
the American Medical Association, Rothberg claims that spending toward defensive
medicine is nearly 78 billion (Hiltzik 2014). By decreasing the likelihood of being
slapped with a medical malpractice lawsuit, the reform discourages doctors from
engaging in defensive medicine, in turn decreasing overall healthcare costs.
On the other hand, an argument can be made that the reform is disruptive because
it can theoretically take advantage of the injured. The defensive techniques mentioned
earlier often ensure consumers’ safety. One could argue that by discouraging doctors,
automobile companies, product manufacturers, etc. from spending this defensive money,
they’re simultaneously decreasing the safety of these products and services. Also,
opponents argue that whether or not a threshold of liability has been reached by the
plaintiff, if there is any fault of someone else damages should be recovered. By not
holding those at fault accountable, and therefore limiting the amount defendants have to
6

pay, plaintiffs are unable to recover the complete size of the damages they deserve
(Goguen 2015). By looking at the size of damages recovered before and after each
reform, this report tests whether or not the legislation actually impacts the money
plaintiffs receive.
II.B. The Different Components of Damages
In order to better understand the nature of the reform, and begin to recognize the
impact it has on damages recovered, it’s necessary to explore its various components. In
this section of the paper, we will explicitly define the three components that make up the
total damages recovered in tort law.
Economic Loss
According to Texas law, “economic damages means compensatory damages
intended to compensate a claimant for actual economic or pecuniary loss” (“Civil
Practice and Remedies Code” 2013). Put more simply, if a product or service causes
personal injury to the consumer, the economic loss is the cost of the original product or
medical cost, in addition to future medical costs and any lost wages. Economic loss is
organized into two subcategories—direct economic loss and consequential economic loss
(“Economic Loss Doctrine in All 50 States” 2015). The direct economic loss is the
difference between the value of the product or service with and without the malfunction.
This is also defined by the cost of replacement or to repair a product or service. For
example, if a doctor is found guilty of medical malpractice during a patient’s back
surgery and causes more damage, the direct economic loss is the cost of another surgery
to repair the injury—the medical costs. The consequential economic loss is harder to
7

calculate—it’s all indirect loss of benefit from the service or product error. This includes
any loss of profit due to one’s inability to use a product or lack of service performed. In
the back surgery example above, the consequential economic loss is the patient’s lost
wages caused by the additional weeks off of work. If the patient works in construction, he
would not be able to go back to work for a longer period of time, potentially increasing
the consequential economic loss substantially. The lawsuits analyzed in this report deal
mostly with direct economic loss—in this case the medical costs as opposed to lost
wages.
Noneconomic Loss
Texas law defines noneconomic loss as the “damages awarded for the purpose of
compensating a claimant for physical pain and suffering, mental or emotional pain or
anguish, loss of consortium, disfigurement, physical impairment, loss of companionship
and society, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to reputation, and all other
nonpecuniary losses of any kind other than exemplary damages” (“Civil Practice and
Remedies Code” 2013). Because it is not a value that is traded on the market, but rather
an impact on a person’s personal welfare, calculating a particular value can be
problematic. However, depending on the nature of the case, because it is the effect on
one’s own welfare, noneconomic losses can have a substantially larger impact that
economic loss.1 Using the example highlighted above of the medical malpractice lawsuit,
1

In Stacey Galette vs. Winthrop Hospital, Galette sued the Brooklyn hospital for a botched surgery geared
at removing an ectopic pregnancy. When the hospital was late in noticing a 5-millimeter hole in her colon,
Galette had an infection that quickly led to blood poisoning. After extensive time in intensive care, she
had both legs amputated and suffered significant hearing loss. The jury awarded Galette 62 million dollars
total—$20 million for past pain and suffering, $38 million for future pain and suffering, and $4 million for
medical expenses. In this instance, the economic damages awarded were just $4 million. However, due to
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perhaps the error in surgery caused a back injury that is permanent. Now, the patient will
suffer from mild back pain for the rest of his life. The resulting loss of enjoyment to his
life is worth a lot more than the medical costs. In this case, the noneconomic loss is
greater than the economic loss.
Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are the most disputed source of damages rewarded in lawsuits.
In certain circumstances, if the court feels that the damages rewarded from the economic
loss and non-economic loss are not a sufficient punishment, they add additional punitive
damages. They are used primarily as a deterrence for the defendant, and others who may
find themselves in an analogous situation, from future similar behavior. Punitive damages
are often rewarded in situations where the defendant acts in a particularly unethical
manor.2 It’s worth noting that while punitive damages only constitute 1-4% of total
malpractice awards, the impact of punitive damages on physician behavior can appear
much larger (Malani and Reif 2010).

the nature of the medical malpractice, the noneconomic loss was significantly larger. The $20 million for
past pain and suffering, and $38 million for future pain and suffering, both are noneconomic damages
recovered (Garcia, 2010).
2
Henry and Lorraine Chanin sued the Teva Parenteral Medicine and Baxter Healthcare Services for claims
that the product propofol, often used for anesthetic, can cause a patient to get hepatitis C. Henry Chanin
was infected with hepatitis C in 2006 when he was given the anesthetic at Desert Shadow Endoscopy
Center. The case relied on the fact that the drug packaging did not include sufficient warning that reusing
the vials causes hepatitis C. Despite knowledge that the package had insufficient labeling, and that nurses
were misinterpreting the vials ability to be reused, the drug companies continued selling them because
they were profitable. The jury awarded Chanin $356 million of punitive damages from Teva and $144
million of punitive damages from Baxter, based on the profit figures from the companies. In this instance,
punitive damages were awarded to punish Teva and Baxter for their unethical and dangerous behavior
that caused a major spread of hepatitis C. Furthermore, by coming down hard on drug companies that
choose personal profit over ensuring patient safety, the jury deters future instances of similar behavior
from other drug companies (German et al., 2010).
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II.C. Current Research Fails to Discuss Comprehensive Relationship between Reform
and Payouts
As highlighted previously, Texas tort law reform has been a major source of
debate over the last couple of decades. Given the large impact it has had on medical
professionals behavior, and the perceived impact the reform has had on the entire tort law
system, it’s worthwhile to investigate the reform’s influence on the various components
of damages mentioned above. That is to say, quantitatively, what impact has the reform
had on the economic loss, noneconomic loss, punitive damages, and total allocated loss
rewarded to plaintiffs in Texas tort law. From this, I am able to discuss the effectiveness
of tort law reform in impacting payouts.
As shown in II. A. The Tort Reform State, some previous research investigates the
reform’s impact on health care professionals behavior over time; there has been an influx
of doctors into Texas, and potentially fewer “defensive surgeries”. The American
Medical Association no longer labels Texas as one of its states in crisis (Nixon 2013).
Access to healthcare is clearly at unprecedented levels in Texas due to the huge increase
in health care professionals (“10 Years of Tort Reform” 2013).
Avraham’s paper The Impact of Tort Reform on Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance Premiums also makes claims regarding the tort reform’s impact on defensive
medicine and aggregate health care costs (Avraham, et al., 2010). President Obama
contributed to the discussion on defensive medicine in fall 2009, stating, “I don’t believe
malpractice reform is a silver bullet, but I have talked to enough doctors to know that
defensive medicine may be contributing to unnecessary costs” (Paik et al., 2012).
10

Avraham uses his research on tort law reform broken down by state to discuss the direct
relationship between tort reform and aggregate health care costs by state—suggesting that
as tort reform increases, defensive health care decreases” (Avraham, et al., 2010). This
further implies that Texas doctors’ behaviors have in fact been shaped by the Texas
reform—their fear of a medical malpractice lawsuit has decreased where they are no
longer engaging in the same level of defensive health care, potentially cutting health care
costs.
Bernard Black at the University of Northwestern School of Law looked more into
the relationship between tort reform in Texas and aggregate health care costs. Dissimilar
to Avraham, Black was unable to find any evidence showing a relationship between 2003
Texas tort reform and health care costs. By looking at Medicare spending and spending
trends at the county level before and after the reform, the paper found no decrease in
aggregate spending. In order to potentially control for increasing health care costs at a
country wide level, the paper compared Medicare spending in Texas to spending levels
and trends in other states at the same time. There was no evidence suggesting the 2003
tort reform impacted any Medicare spending in Texas (Paik et al., 2012). Still, this paper
does not track the reform’s impact on the payout.
Before recently, there was not sufficient data to track the damages recovered over
time in order to make claims on the impact the reform has had on size and quantity of tort
lawsuits. The Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) has recently made available claim
level data that is essential to our understanding of tort lawsuits in Texas. However,
previous research has used this information primarily to analyze the relationship between
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these lawsuits, the liability system in general, and the insurance market within Texas.
Kathryn Zeiler’s paper on Medical Malpractice Liability Crisis or Patient Compensation
Crisis uses the data to suggest a patient liability system in crisis, as opposed to a system
that blames rising insurance premiums on the medical malpractice liability system. The
paper claims that the patient liability system is in crisis because it “severely limit[s] the
ability of the liability system to deliver civil justice negligently injured patients” (Zeiler
2009).
Perhaps the most relevant previous research comes from David Hyman and
Bernard Black in 2009 in Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice
Cases: Evidence from Texas. In this paper, the researchers begin to look at the
relationship between reform and payouts by estimating the impact of the 2003 Texas
reform on all jury verdicts, post-verdict payouts, and settlements in medical malpractice
cases closed in 1988-2004. The results suggest that the 2003 cap on noneconomic
damages impacted 47% of verdicts by reducing the mean total payout by 27% and the
noneconomic damages by 73% (Hyman et al., 2009). This evidence implies that the 2003
reform was successful at impacting medical malpractice damages recovered. However,
this paper still does not discuss the history of Texas tort reform in its entirety. By
narrowing in on one specific law from 2003 and focusing on the medical malpractice
policy type, the paper is unable to make comprehensive claims regarding the tort reform
system in Texas.
A later paper by Hyman and Black in 2013 discusses tort reform and payouts in
medical malpractice lawsuits on a national level. Looking at national medical malpractice
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claims in the 1990s and 2000s, the researchers find strong evidence that damage caps
have a strong impact at reducing the payout per physician within a state (Paik et al.,
2013). While this research aids our understanding on medical malpractice caps on
damages recovered on a national level, it doesn’t consider other policy types within tort
law reform nor focuses its analysis on the complex history of Texas reform.
There is no current research with the main emphasis of exploring the quantitative
impact that all tort law reform has had on payouts—both in terms of dollar value and size
of damages recovered. That is to say that the current research does not provide evidence
on the complete recent history of the reform’s ability to influence payments. More than
just the 2003 cap on noneconomic damages, how has the rest of Texas tort reform
impacted damages recovered? Beyond solely medical malpractice lawsuits, how has the
reform impacted other policy areas? While some reform geared at capping damages
applies solely to medical malpractice lawsuits, has it created a culture of lower damages
that has pervaded into other policy types? How has the other types of tort law reform,
including restricting joint and several liability and placing caps on punitive damages,
affected payouts? In this empirical work, we make connections between the
comprehensive recent history of tort reform in Texas and its impact on the size of
damages rewarded. From this, we are able to provide evidence regarding tort law
reform’s success in influencing payouts.
III. Data
My primary data source is the Texas Department of Insurance Closed Claim
Survey. The Texas Department of Insurance aims to “regulate the insurance industry
13

fairly and diligently, promote a stable and competitive market, and provide information
that makes a difference.” Created in 1876, the Texas Department of Insurance has a
history of “protect[ing] policyholders and serv[ing] the greater public interest through the
effective regulation of the U.S. insurance marketplace” (About TDI). As a subsector of
the Property and Casualty Reports, the Closed Claim Annual Reports began collecting
data in 1988 after a sudden increase in insurance premiums for medical malpractice cases
(Zeiler 2009). The Closed Claim Survey collects entry level data, including information
on liability, the type of injury, type of claim, jury verdicts, types of insurance used, and
size of the economic loss, noneconomic loss, and total allocated loss in various situations.
The survey collects information on 220 different variables in order to fully understand the
nature of each claim. There are 225,791 entries from 1988-2012. Table 3 reports the
descriptive statistics for every variable within the regression.
I ran three types of regressions, using three unique dependent variables—
economic loss, non-economic loss, and total allocated loss. All of these variables were
adjusted for CPI and brought from their value during the year of injury to their 2012
values. There are four types of variables controlled for in each regression. First, I
controlled for type of injury, using binary variables for the 33 different injury types. If the
injury occurred within the specific claim, the variable took on the number 1, and if it
didn’t occur, it takes on a 0. Table 2 lists all of the variables used and the type of variable.
The 33 different injury types are included as independent variables and highlighted in
Table 2. The name of the variable highlights the nature of the injury. For example,
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“railway” means injury on a railway while “eye injury (blindness)” means the injury
caused the person to be blind.3
Next, I controlled for the five policy types included in the survey listed in Table
2.4 In the regression, the policy type variable is labeled as “categorical,” and would take
on the value of 1-5 depending on the policy type. It would equal 1 if monoline general
liability, 2 if commercial auto liability, 3 if texas commercial multiperil, 4 if medical
professional liability, and 5 if medical professional liability. The descriptive statistics in
Table 3 for the “categorical” variable is therefore not helpful for interpretation.
We also included year variables to account for the upward trend in damages
awarded over time. Because this upward trend is not a result of the effectiveness of a law,
year variables need to be included in the regressions. The year we included in the
regression is the year the claim was closed. The average year used for the sample was
1990 and ranged from 1988 to 2010.
Finally, I generated law variables so we can read the impact that each existing law
has on the loss values. Each law variable only exists for the time the law was effective—
meaning if a law was adjusted after 3 years, the variable only exists for the three years the
3

This was important to control for in that the damages awarded to the more extreme
injuries are larger. If our goal is to lean about the relationship between a law change and
the different kinds of losses, we don’t want the varying injury severities to have an
impact. In Table 3, it shows that 7.7% of injuries include death, while only .4% include
falls. Because death is by nature more extreme, and would result in more extreme
damages paid when compared with falls, we must control for it in order to limit its impact
on the output variable.
4
This is also essential to control for because the size and nature of the payout for each
policy type is innately different—the policy type impacts the size of economic loss, noneconomic loss, and total allocated loss. We need to include these as independent variables
in order account for this disparity.
15

law was effective. The laws used are the laws described in Table 1. The law reform is
pulled from the Database of State Law Reforms (5th edition) complied by Ronen
Avraham at the University of Texas at Austin- School of Law in May 2014. The
database includes the “most prevalent tort reforms in the United States between 1980 and
2012.” Avraham used existing data, original legislation, and case law to build the dataset.
The fifth addition corrects for errors in the previous four editions and standardizes reform
terminology (Avraham 2014). It is important to note that while there are 15 laws, there
are only 10 law variables. Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability) 1, Caps
on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability 2), and Periodic Payments (Medical
Liability), Caps on Punitive Damages 2 and Punitive Damages (Evidence) 2, Caps on
Punitive Damages 1 and Punitive Damages (Evidence) 1, Caps on Punitive Damages
(Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability) and Comparative Fault were each combined
into one variable each because they are effective for the same time period. That is to say
that because both Caps on Punitive Damages 2 and Punitive Damages (Evidence) 2 were
both effective on September 1, 1995, I only generated one variable to encompass both
laws. Often times, these laws were part of a grouping geared at having one impact, in this
case decreasing punitive damages awarded, so interpreting them as one variable makes
sense. This also helps decrease multicollinearity within the regression. From this
combined variable, we are able to interpret the impact both laws have on damages. See
Table 4 for a graphical representation of the timing of the law changes to understand the
law progression and which laws overlap.
IV. Empirical Specification
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Theoretically, tort law reform in Texas would result in some sort of change in the
level of payout—the extent of this change and the nature of what kind of damages it
impacts is dependent on what reform we’re looking at. For example, if there is a law
passed that caps noneconomic damages, one would assume that there were previous
instances of noneconomic damages recovered greater than this cap. By getting rid of
these high noneconomic damage payouts, there would then be smaller values of
noneconomic damages rewarded overall. With our regression in mind, it would follow
that “Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability) 1, Caps on Noneconomic
Damages (Medical Liability) 2, Periodic Payments (Medical Liability)” would decrease
noneconomic loss.
From this theory, I concentrated the majority of my empirical analysis on the
relationship between the law reforms and the changes in loss. I started by looking at the
relationship between the law reforms and changes in total allocated loss. By comparing
the direction and the extent of this change with the relationship between the law reforms
and the changes in both economic loss and non-economic loss, I’m able to make more
specific claims about the emphasis of each law reform and its pursuant effect.
In analyzing this impact, I used two different regression types for each of the
three types of losses. First, I used regressions with all of the law variables included as
independent variables. It is this type of regression that I used for the majority of the
analysis. The regression results for this group are summarized in Table 5. It’s necessary
to include each of the law variables in this regression group because it’s not as though
only one law exists at once. Because these reforms build upon each other and often
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overlap, we need to acknowledge that other laws are potentially impacting the dependent
variables (the values of the damages) at the same time. By not including them, there
would be omitted variable bias. Therefore, the three regressions in this grouping are of
the following form:
1)

where i is denoted by the individual. The independent variable

is an

indicator that takes on the value of the year the claim was closed. For example, if the
claim was closed in 1988,

would equal 1988.

is an

indicator equal to one if the injury included death. This is the same way to interpret all 33
injury type variables from

to

.

is an indicator equal to 1 if

the policy type is monoline general liability, 2 if commercial auto liability, 3 if Texas
commercial multiperil, 4 if medical professional liability, and 5 if other professional
liability.

is an indicator if the law reform “Caps on Noneconomic

Damages (Medical Liability 1, Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability) 2,
Periodic Payments (Medical Liability)” is effective during the ist claim. Each law
variable is a similar indicator variable if the law reform is effective for the
dependent variable

claim. The

is the natural log of g where g is either total allocated loss,

economic loss, or noneconomic loss. Finally, is the constant term in the regression.
The summary table for the second regression grouping is shown in Table 6. In this
grouping, I went through each of the ten law variables and created ten new regressions
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that only have one law variable in each. This process was repeated for the three types of
independent variables—total allocated loss, economic loss, and noneconomic loss. By
comparing the coefficients of the law variables to the coefficients of the law variables in
the first grouping of regressions explained above, I am able to assess the multicolinearity
of each law. If the coefficients are drastically different between the two regression
groupings for the same law variable with the same dependent variable, then it would
follow that the law variable is strongly correlated with another one of the law variables.
This serves as a check on the quality of the data. The regressions in this grouping are of
the following form:
1)

where all of the variables have the same denotation as the previous grouping of
regressions.

is the law variable for the

law where the

law

is one of the ten Texas tort law reforms laid out in Table 1.
In several instances, it is worthwhile to look at the specific policy type that is
most impacted by each reform. In a few cases, the reform only applies to a specific policy
type. For example, the reforms included in the variable “Caps on Noneconomic Damages
(Medical Liability) 1, Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability) 2, Periodic
Payments (Medical Liability)” is specified to the medical liability policy type. As a
result, one would think the impact on damages is solely on medical liability claims. This
would suggest that in the regression, the only significant impact this reform has would be
in the medical professional liability policy type. By analyzing the potential impact on
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other policy types, we are able to discuss the degree of interconnectedness between each
policy type within Texas tort law.
Finally, as shown in Table 1, a few of the law reforms have similar aims. For
example, there are multiple laws that relate to capping medical liability damages,
restricting joint and several liability, and capping punitive damages. My empirical
analysis is not only focused on each law variable separately, but also groups the law
variables together by reform type in order to comment on the success of each reform goal
over time.
V. Results and Implications
The results are presented by reform grouping—caps on medical liability damages,
caps on punitive damages, and joint and several liability reform. First, I analyze the
impact of each law variable separately, and next I make assertions about the effectiveness
of each reform grouping.
V. A. Caps on Medical Liability Damages
In this section, we analyze the three law variables, consisting of five law reforms,
that relate to medical liability.
The history of Texas medical malpractice law reform began on August 29, 1977
when total damages for medical liability (excluding medical costs) were limited to
$500,000 (indexed to CPI). Theoretically the impact of this law would be to decrease the
total damages rewarded, in turn limiting the defensive medical costs by ensuring doctors
there won’t be large claims brought against them. The name of this law variable in our
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regression is “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non Wrongful Death Claims)
2.” Part of this same law package however, and effective on the same August 29, 1977
date, is the second law reform, “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non
Wrongful Death Claims) 1.” This law also capped total damages for medical liability at
$500,000, however now both punitive damages and medical costs were excluded from
this cap. The reason for not including them in the same law variable is that the first part,
“Caps on Total Damages (Medical liability, Non Wrongful Death Claims) 2, officially
ended in 1988. Because they were both listed separately, and one ended in 1988 while the
other one still exists, I felt it necessary to include each of them as their own variable to
isolate their potential success.
“Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non Wrongful Death Claims) 2,” the
law that does not specify that punitive damages are excluded from the cap, does not show
a significant decrease in total allocated loss. Rather, the coefficient from this independent
variable is positive at .383, as shown in Table 5. This can be explained by the fact that
when this specific law was taken out of action on May 11, 1988, there was another law
that existed with a very similar aim, “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non
Wrongful Death Claims) 1.” The only difference between the two laws is that the second
one excluded punitive damages from the cap on total damages. Therefore, it’s fair to
argue that “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non Wrongful Death Claims) 2”
has no meaningful effect on the total damages.
However, there is a significant effect within the second part of the law package
that still exists today, “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non Wrongful Death
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Claims) 1.” Because the cap on total damages for this law excluded punitive damages,
and the total allocated loss figure included punitive damages, our empirical analysis only
focuses on the economic loss and non-economic loss regressions. As shown in Table 5,
since this law has been enacted, damages through economic loss are on average 42.9%
lower, and damages through non-economic loss are on average 37.6% lower. This effect
is statistically significant at the 1% significance level for both the economic loss and
noneconomic loss regressions. This would suggest that the law succeeded in decreasing
the size of total damages (excluding punitive damages).
By looking at the policy type specifications in Table 7, we can learn whether or
not the law reform impacted the total allocated loss figure for all policy types. Did the
law solely impact economic and noneconomic damages in the Medical professional
liability policy type as intended, or did the cap on total damages create a culture of
limiting damages that pervaded into other policy types? The results, as highlighted in
Table 7, show no evidence that “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non
Wrongful Death Claims) 1,” geared at decreasing damages solely in Medical professional
liability, decreases the total allocated loss in any of the policy types. This can potentially
be explained by the fact that the law capped total damages excluding punitive damages,
and therefore wouldn’t have an impact on a total allocated loss figure that included
punitive damages from any policy type. Regardless, the results highlight how the law
reform “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non Wrongful Death Claims) 1” did
succeed at decreasing economic loss and non-economic loss, and did not impact the total
allocated loss figure for any policy type.
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The final law reform in this grouping was adopted in early September 2003, and
consisted of three parts. The first part, “Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical
Liability) 2,” is a constitutional amendment that gave Texas Legislature the power to
place limits on noneconomic damages for healthcare related lawsuits. The second part,
“Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability 1),” took advantage of the preceding
amendment by capping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases against
doctors to $250,000 per facility and $500,000 overall. The final part, Periodic Payments
(Medical Liability), allowed the court to order future damages above $100,000 be paid in
periodic payments. The goal of all three of these laws was to expand upon the previous
medical liability reform from nearly thirty years prior. By further capping damages, and
giving guilty doctors the ability to pay large damages in periodic payments, the court
aims to decrease the size of lawsuits filed against doctors. The results, laid out in Table 5,
imply that the law succeeded in decreasing the noneconomic loss figure. More
specifically, with the law reform package “Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical
Liability) 1, Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability) 2, Periodic Payments
(Medical Liability” effective, noneconomic loss decreased by 9.78%. This figure proved
to be statistically significant at the 5% significance level. In line with the reform geared
solely at affecting non-economic loss, there is no evidence of an impact on economic
loss. These results imply that the reform was successful at limiting the damages filed
against doctors, and that the substantial increase in physicians moving to Texas since this
reform is warranted.
It is interesting to note that there is a significant decrease in total allocated loss
within each policy type, not just within medical professional liability. Despite the nature
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of the cap geared at decreasing noneconomic damages within the medical professional
liability policy type, all of the policy types had a significant decrease in total allocated
loss as shown in Table 7. This demonstrates the fact that a reform within one policy type
has the potential to change the trend of damages within other policy types as well. In this
case, the cap to noneconomic damages in medical professional liability pervaded into
other policy types and led to across the board decreases. This suggests that lawmakers
need to be conscious about the indirect effects of reform on other aspects of tort law.
V. B. Caps on Punitive Damages
The next grouping of laws includes four different law reforms—three related to
capping punitive damages, and one introducing comparative fault. As described below,
these reforms have been combined into three law variables for my analysis.
The first two law reforms were passed in 1973 and further limit the potential
damages claimants can seek. Because of high correlation with one another, and in order
to avoid multicollinearity, I have combined these reforms into one law variable: “Caps on
Punitive Damages (Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability), Comparative Fault.”
The first reform, “Comparative fault,” reduces the claimant’s damages by the proportion
of his or her fault, and restricts claimants from filing damages if his or her fault is greater
than 50%. Success for this law would result in both a decrease in the number of claims
filed and a decrease in the size of the claim. The second reform, “Caps on Punitive
Damages (Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability),” limits the size of the punitive
damages to three times economic damages, with the aim of restricting large punitive
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damage payments. Success for this reform would decrease the size of punitive damages
recovered.
The results, however, suggest there is no evidence that the law variable “Caps on
Punitive Damages (Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability), Comparative Fault”
decreases punitive damages. Rather, there shows a significant increase in total allocated
loss after the laws were enacted. However, when looking at the regression in Table 6, the
regressions that only include the one relevant law variable, there is no evidence of an
impact either way. This potentially suggests a correlation between “Caps on Punitive
Damages (Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability), Comparative Fault” and the other
laws. Initially, I thought one possible explanation for the lack of meaningful impact was
that in capping punitive damages to three times the economic damages, economic
damages increased as well. That said, there shows no evidence of an increase in
economic loss since the law became effective, discounting this theory. According to the
Journal of Consumer & Commercial Law, the extent to which this law was followed,
meaning a conservative interpretation or a liberal interpretation of the law, has developed
over time. Those enforcing the law have also varied in their level of enforcement
(Alderman 2005). This large level of variability since the law was passed in 1973 can
potentially explain the lack of punitive damage reduction. Furthermore, the same
explanation can be given for lack of impact from “Comparative fault.” Perhaps the
variability in “Caps on Punitive Damages (Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability)”
limited the impact of “Comparative Fault.” Finally, perhaps there is no evidence that
“Comparative Fault” impacted damages because it was common practice to not claim
damages unless the plaintiff was less than 50% guilty. If the law solely put the state’s
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practices into written law, rather than forcing these practices to change, there would be no
significant impact on damages.
With ineffective punitive damage reform in the early 1970s, another law was
passed in 1987, “Caps on Punitive Damages I.” “Caps on Punitive Damages I” limited
punitive damages to either $200,000 or two times the economic damages (whichever is
greater), on top of no more than $750,000 of noneconomic damages. This law expanded
the previous one in 1973 by more specifically laying out the limit of punitive damages,
with the aim of directly decreasing the size of punitive damages rewarded. The results in
Table 5 suggest that total allocated loss decreased by 28% after the law become effective.
This is highly significant at the 1% significance level. There is no evidence of a decrease
in economic loss or noneconomic loss, implying the majority of the decreased total
allocated loss is driven by a decrease in punitive damages. From this, we can confidently
say that the law “Caps on Punitive Damages I” effectively reduced punitive damages.
This law lasted until September 1, 1995 when a new cap on punitive damages was
passed. The final punitive damages reform, noted as “Caps on Punitive Damages 2,”
limits punitive damages to the greater of $200,000 or four times the amount of economic
damages + noneconomic damages. According to the Journal of Consumer & Commercial
Law, “the Republican controlled legislature enacted a broad reform agenda that
attempt[ed] to limit the amount of damages… exempt certain large transactions, and
make it easier for defendants to force a settlement” (Alderman 2005). Essentially, the
goal of this law is to further increase the power of the defendants by limiting punitive
damages. From the results in Table 5, we can infer that since “Caps on Punitive Damages
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2” came into effect, total allocated loss has decreased by 85.4%. This figure holds at the
1% significance level. Both the changes in economic loss and noneconomic loss are not
significant, implying that the large drop is driven by decreasing punitive damages. This
effect is relatively extreme, highlighting the law’s impressive success over time.
In general, since a failed first attempt at capping punitive damages, Texas
legislature has succeeded at reducing punitive damages.
V. C. Joint and Several Liability Reform
The final grouping of laws aims to restrict joint and several liability by
prohibiting its application unless the defendant reaches a certain threshold of guilt.
According to the American Tort Reform Association, “joint and several liability is a
theory that permits the plaintiff to recover damages from multiple defendants
collectively, or from each defendant individually” (Joint and Several Liability Rule
Reform). Theoretically, if a state follows joint and several liability, a defendant who is
just 10% guilty could end up paying for 100% of damages if the other defendants are
unable to pay (“Joint and Several Liability Rule Reform | ATRA.”) Advocates of the rule
site the plaintiff’s right to recover total damages from an injury minus his or her own
fault. On the other hand, restricting this rule protects defendants from paying a
disproportionate level of damages from their degree of fault (“Joint and Several Liability
Rule Reform”). In limiting the use of joint and several liability, total damages would
theoretically decrease—if a defendant doesn’t have to pay for another’s damages who
can’t afford it, the plaintiff would not receive the same amount of damages on average.
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The first legislation passed in Texas limiting joint and several liability reform
was passed in 1985, and has since been amended three times, each time more and more
restricting its application. In this section, by looking at the behavior of damages after
each of the four laws pass, I am able to quantitatively measure the laws’ effectiveness.
The first law in this grouping, “Joint and Several Liability 1,” was passed on
September 1, 1985 and prohibited joint and several liability in the case where a plaintiff
is more guilty than a defendant. This would mean that if a plaintiff is 45% guilty,
application of the rule is no longer allowed. From the results in Table 5, we can discern
that total allocated loss decreased by 18.6% after this legislature became effective. This
loss was driven by the 9% drop in economic loss, and large decrease in punitive damages.
While the impact on total allocated loss and economic loss is significant at the 1% level,
there is no sizable or significant effect on noneconomic loss. This effect not only shows
the success of “Joint and Several Liability 1,” but also suggests that an introductory
constraint on the use of joint and several liability does succeed at limiting damages paid
by defendants.
Starting with the first reform in 1987, three reforms have amended “Joint and
Several Liability 1,” adding what appeared to be more stringent constraints. “Joint and
Several Liability 2,” effective September, 1987 to September, 1995, prohibited joint and
several liability in cases where the defendant is less than 20% at fault, or less than 10% at
fault if the plaintiff has no guilt. “Joint and Several Liability 3,” effective from
September, 1995 to July, 2003, increased the threshold of defendant guilt to 50% if the
plaintiff holds some blame, and 15% if the plaintiff is blameless. Finally, “Joint and
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Several Liability 4,” effective since July 2003, prohibited joint and several liability in
cases where the defendant is less than 50% guilty, regardless of the plaintiff’s level of
guilt. However, Table 5 shows no evidence that “Joint and Several Liability 2, ” “Joint
and Several Liability 3,” and “Joint and Several Liability 4” decrease total allocated loss,
economic loss, or noneconomic loss.
There are a couple potential explanations for this. First, perhaps the cases that
took advantage of joint and several liability were solely those where the plaintiff was
more guilty than the defendant. In this instance, after “Joint and Several Liability 1” was
passed and outlawed its application in those cases, no one would have used the rule
anymore. As a result, the following three laws may have worked to impact a rule that was
no longer commonly used, and therefore had no impact on damages.
Another explanation could be the potential multicollinearity that exists between
the last three joint and several liability laws and the other reforms. When looking at the
set of regressions that include the individual law variables by themselves (Table 6), there
is a highly significant decrease in total damages after each additional joint and several
liability law is passed. While I don’t feel comfortable using these data points as evidence
that the legislature was successful because of the omitted variable bias of excluding 9
other laws, it does suggest that multicollinearity potentially exists between the joint and
several liability reforms.
V. D. Potential Flaws
One potential flaw in my analysis is the presence of multicollinearity. I attempted
to mitigate this impact by grouping a few law reforms that had similar dates into one law
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variable. Similarly, I include a series of regressions that only include one law variable at
a time to check for possible correlation between the existing law variables. However,
with this set of regressions there is omitted variable bias in that it assumes no other laws
were passed. In cases where multicollinearity may be a problem, I acknowledge that
when describing the results.
Another potential source of error could be the data itself. In Avraham’s Database
of State Law Reforms (5th edition), he mentions that this is the most prevalent law
reform, however acknowledges that updates may be made as more information becomes
available. Similarly, the Texas Department of Insurance Closed Claim Survey includes
225,791 entries from 1988-2012, accounting for 220 variables in each entry. Because of
the expansive nature of the data in terms of number of observations and variables
accounted for, it is possible that a few data points are inaccurate.
One thing my argument is missing is a comparison of this success with the
success of other states. Throughout the paper I label Texas as the “tort reform state,” but
in order to gauge the reforms’ success I would need a baseline of other state’s success.
What’s more, it would be interesting to more extensively talk about the uniqueness of the
specific reforms within Texas. How aggressive is this reform in limiting damages
recovered when compared to other states? This would be worthwhile to expand upon in
order to fully understand the uniqueness of Texas reform.
VI. Conclusion
With its aggressive history of tort law reform, Texas is known as the “tort reform
state” (LeMance 2015). With a goal of shifting plaintiffs’ behaviors, and decreasing
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doctors’ defensive behaviors, the reform has aimed to decrease damages rewarded. Most
existing research has looked at changes in behavior after each reform. Previous research
also discusses the impact a 2003 cap on noneconomic damages has had on damages
recovered in medical malpractice lawsuits. However, this is the first paper to give a
comprehensive empirical analysis on Texas tort law and the impact it has had on damages
recovered. By analyzing the extent of each reform, and nature of its impact on the
different aspects of damages, I am able to make conclusions on the impact of each law on
damages recovered and make claims regarding the nature of effective state-level tort law
reform.
The findings suggest inconsistent success in caps to damages in medical liability
cases. The results imply that a cap to total damages in medical liability cases do show
evidence of an impact, however only if punitive damages are not included in the total
damage figure. When punitive damages were excluded in the cap to total damages, the
reform decreased economic loss by 42.9% and noneconomic loss by 37.6%. What’s
more, the most recent legislature in 2003 succeeded at decreasing noneconomic damages
by over 9%. These results suggest that future legislation should be geared at capping
economic or noneconomic damages, but not a total damages figure that includes punitive
damages. Other implications of these results revolve around healthcare physician
behavior in Texas. With the lowered potential damages a physician may pay, it would
follow that doctors are more comfortable with practicing medicine in Texas. The
previous research highlighted in II.C. confirms an influx in doctors in Texas post reform.
Another positive implication of the lower damages post the 2003 reform would be a
decrease in healthcare costs for patients. One would think that because doctors are paying
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lower damages to patients, they would charge less for services. As discussed in II.C.,
other research has shown inconsistent evidence on the changing medical costs post
reform. While defensive medicine seems to decrease (Avraham, et al., 2010), it appears
that aggregate health care costs have stayed constant (Paik et al., 2012).
The most recent caps on punitive damages were successfully at limiting punitive
damages rewarded. Since a failed attempt at restricting punitive damages in the early 70s,
caps on punitive damage legislature decreased total damages by 28% in 1987 and 85% in
1995. This increase in effectiveness of each punitive damage law implies that Texas
legislature is becoming more effective at restricting punitive damages—they are more
aware of specifically how to impose a cap. The first failed cap solely limited the reward
in respect to its relation to economic damages. However, the successful caps on punitive
damages placed specific dollar values on the amount of the cap, and added requirements
to the required evidence standard that must be proved. This suggests that in order to have
the most success, legislature geared at capping punitive damages in the future must have
specific value caps along with a description of an evidence standard.
Finally, with the goal of restricting use of joint and several liability, an
introductory legislature effectively decreased total damages by 18.6%. This was followed
by three additional amendments where no meaningful impact was found on damages
rewarded. These results suggest that the application of joint and several liability is
potentially outdated. Another potential implication is that this rule is only used in cases
where the plaintiff has nearly no guilt whatsoever. Because the most recent legislation in
2003 prohibited the use of joint and several liability unless the defendant is 50% or more
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at fault than the plaintiff, and there is no evidence of an impact on damages, one can
assume the rule has never been used if the plaintiff has substantial guilt. As a result, in
order to substantially lower damages recovered, any new restriction to the application of
joint and several liability must mandate the plaintiff have essentially no guilt.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Texas Tort Law Reforms
Effective Date
September 1,
1973

Reform

Description

Comparative Fault

In an action to recover damages, the claimant damages
are reduced in proportion to his own culpable conduct
as compared to the defendant(s) culpable conduct. The
claimant is barred from claiming damages if his
culpable conduct is greater than the cumulative
culpable conduct of all culpable defendants.

1973

Caps on Punitive Damages
(Deceptive Traded Practice,
Product Liability)

Limits the award of punitive damages to three times
economic damages

August 29,
1977 to May
11, 1988

Caps on Total Damages
(Medical Liability, Non
Wrongful Death claims)

Limits total damages to $500,000 (indexed to CPI).
Medical costs are excluded from cap.

August 29,
1977

Caps on Total Damages
(Medical Liability,
Wrongful Death)

Total damages shall not exceed $500,000 (indexed to
CPI) in wrongful death actions. Medical costs are
excluded from cap. Punitive damages are excluded
from cap.

September 1,
1985 to
September 2,
1987

Joint and Several Liability 1

Prohibits the application of joint and several liability
unless defendant is more at fault than plaintiff

September 2,
1987 to
September 1,
1995

Punitive Damages
(Evidence) 1

Requires a plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant's actions were fraudulent,
malicious, or grossly negligent

September 2,
1987 to
September 1,
1995

Caps on Punitive Damages
1

Limits the award of punitive damages to the greater of
$200,000 or four times the award of actual damages.
Caps do not apply for certain intentional acts that are
also felonies.

September 2,
1987 to
September 1,
1995

Joint and Several Liability 2

Prohibits the application of joint and several liability
unless defendant is more than 20% at fault, or if
plaintiff is blameless, defendant is more than 10% at
fault, and there is a toxic tort.
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September 1,
1995

Caps on Punitive Damages
2

Limits the award of punitive damages to the greater of
$200,000 or two times the award of economic damages
plus non-economic damages up to $750,000, with
exceptions for certain intentional acts that are also
felonies.

September 1,
1995

Punitive Damages
(Evidence) 2

Requires that a plaintiff show by clear and convincing
evidence that defendant is guilty of fraud, malice, or
willful or wanton conduct

September 1,
1995 to July 1,
2003

Joint and Several Liability 3

Prohibits the application of joint and several liability
unless defendant is more than 50% at fault, or if
plaintiff is blameless, defendant is more than 15% at
fault, and there is a toxic tort.

July 1, 2003

Joint and Several Liability 4

Prohibits the application of joint and several liability
unless defendance is 50% or more at fault.

September 1,
2003

Periodic Payments (Medical
Liability)

The court may, at the request of either party, order that
future damages above $100,000 will be paid in periodic
payments

September 1,
2003

Caps on Noneconomic
Damages (Medical
Liability) 1

Limits noneconomic damages to $250,000 in medical
malpractice cases against doctors ($250,000 per
facility, with an overall cap of $500,000).

Adopted
September 13,
2003

Caps on Noneconomic
Damages (Medical
Liability) 2

Constitutional amendment that provides that the Texas
Legislature has the authroity to place limits on
noneconomic damages for healthcare related lawsuits.
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Table 2. Variable Description
Variable
Description
Independent- Year

Each year from 1988-2012

Independent- Law Reform

10 distinct law reform groupings

Independent- Injury Type

Death

Independent- Injury Type

Amputation

Independent- Injury Type

Burns (heat)

Independent- Injury Type

Burns (chemical)

Independent- Injury Type

Systemic poisoning (toxic)

Independent- Injury Type

Systemic poisoning (other)

Independent- Injury Type

Eye injury (blindness)

Independent- Injury Type

Respiratory condition

Independent- Injury Type

Nervous condition

Independent- Injury Type

Hearing loss or impairment

Independent- Injury Type

Circulatory condition

Independent- Injury Type

Multiple injuries

Independent- Injury Type

Back injury

Independent- Injury Type

Skin disorder

Independent- Injury Type

Brain damage

Independent- Injury Type

Scarring

Independent- Injury Type

Spinal cord injuries

Independent- Injury Type

Other injury

Independent- Injury Type

Off road vehicle

Independent- Injury Type

Air transportation

Independent- Injury Type

Railway

Independent- Injury Type

Other motor vehicle

Independent- Injury Type

Surgical/medical care

Independent- Injury Type

Falls

Independent- Injury Type

Drowning

Independent- Injury Type

Use of defective product

Independent- Injury Type

Fire

Independent- Injury Type

Firearms

Independent- Injury Type

Pollution/ Toxic exposure

Independent- Injury Type

Explosions

Independent- Injury Type

Use of agricultural machinery

Independent- Injury Type

Oil and gas extraction

Independent- Injury Type

Other

Independent- Policy Type

Monoline general liability

Independent- Policy Type

Commercial auto liability

Independent- Policy Type

Texas commercial multiperil

Independent- Policy Type

Medical professional liability
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Independent- Policy Type

Other professional liability

Dependent

Total allocated loss

Dependent

Economic loss

Dependent

Non-economic loss
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES
Year Claim Closed
Death
Amputation
Burns (heat)
Burns (chemical)
Systemic poisoning
(toxic)
Systemic poisoning
(other)
Eye Injury (blindness)
Respiratory condition
Nervous condition
Hearing loss or
impairment
Circulatory condition
Multiple injuries
Back injury
Skin disorder
Brain damage
Scarring
Spinal cord injuries
Other
Off road Vehicle
Air transportation
Railway
Other Motor Vehicle
Surgical/Medical care
Falls
Drowining
Use of defective
product
Fire
Firearms
Pollution/Toxic
exposure
Explosions
Use of agricultural
machinery
Oil & gas extraction
Other
Categorical
Caps on Noneconomic
Damages (Medical
Liability) 1, Caps on
Noneconomic Damages
(Medical Liability) 2,
Periodic Payments

Number of
Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791

1,999
0.077
0.008
0.009
0.003

6.322
0.266
0.089
0.097
0.052

1,988
0
0
0
0

2,010
1
1
1
1

225,791

0.009

0.096

0

1

225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791

0.001
0.006
0.012
0.007

0.038
0.079
0.111
0.084

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791
225,791

0.003
0.004
0.171
0.197
0.002
0.022
0.020
0.009
0.124
0.006
0.000
0.001
0.264
0.093
0.094
0.002

0.052
0.062
0.377
0.398
0.050
0.146
0.140
0.094
0.330
0.078
0.012
0.038
0.441
0.290
0.291
0.048

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

225,791
225,791
225,791

0.024
0.004
0.003

0.152
0.064
0.057

0
0
0

1
1
1

225,791
225,791

0.011
0.004

0.106
0.065

0
0

1
1

225,791
225,791
225,791
225,789

0.001
0.003
0.064
1.921

0.037
0.059
0.245
1.152

0
0
0
1

1
1
1
5

225,791

0.542

1.153

0

3
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(Medical Liability)

Caps on Punitive
Damages 2, Punitive
Damages (Evidence) 2
Caps on Punitive
Damages 1, Punitive
Damages Evidence 1
Caps on Punitive
Damages (Deceptive
Trade Practice, Product
Liability), Comparative
Fault
Caps on Total
Damages (Medical
Liability, Non Wrongful
Death Claims) 2
Caps on Total
Damages (Medical
Liability, Wrongful
Death) 1
Joint and Several
Liability 4
Joint and Several
Liability 3
Joint and Several
Liability 2
Joint and Several
Liability 1
Total Allocated loss
Economic loss
Non-economic loss
ln(Allocated loss)
ln(Economic loss)
ln(Non-economic loss)

225,791

1.055

0.998

0

2

225,791

0.797

0.971

0

2

225,791

0.102

0.302

0

1

225,791

0.997

0.053

0

1

225,791

1.997

0.077

0

2

225,791

0.184

0.388

0

1

225,791

0.343

0.475

0

1

225,791

0.571

0.495

0

1

225,791

0.047

0.212

0

1

225,791
225,791
225,791
147,700
42,176
49,634

14,113
11,960
23,766
8.727
9.782
10.340

91,418
114,308
174,520
1.789
1.417
1.396

0
0
0
-0.564
2.931
3.985

3.30E+07
1.33E+07
1.29E+07
17.31
16.4
16.37
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Table 4. Texas Tort Law Timeline

Comparative Fault- Effective 1973
Caps on Punitive Damages (Deceptive Traded Practice, Product Liability) - Effective 1973
Caps on Total Damages (Medical
Liability, Non Wrongful Death
Claims- Effective 1977- 1988
Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Wrongful Death) - Effective 1977
Joint and
Several
Liability
1Effective
19851987
Punitive
Damages
(Evidence) 1 and
Caps on Punitive
Damages 1Effective 19871995
Joint and Several
Liability 2
Effective 19871995
Punitive Damages (Evidence) 2 and Caps on
Punitive Damages 2- Effective 1995
Joint and Several
Liability 3- Effective
1995-2003
Joint and Several
Liability 4Effective 2003
Periodic Payments
and Caps on
Noneconomic
Damages 1 and 2
(Medical
Liability) –
Effective 2003
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Table 5. Regression summary table using all laws in regressions
Regression Type
Law Names
Caps on Noneconomic
Damages (Medical
Liability) 1, Caps on
Noneconomic
Damages (Medical
Liability) 2, Periodic
Payments (Medical
Liability)

Caps on Punitive
Damages 2, Punitive
Damages (Evidence) 2

Caps on Punitive
Damages 1, Punitive
Damages Evidence 1

Caps on Punitive
Damages (Deceptive
Trade Practice,
Product Liability),
Comparative Fault

Caps on Total
Damages (Medical
Liability, Non
Wrongful Death
Claims)

Caps on Total
Damages (Medical
Liability, Wrongful
Death)

Joint and Several
Liability 4

Joint and Several
Liability 3

Total Allocated Loss

Economic Loss

Noneconomic
Loss

-0.117
(0.0736)

0.00313
(0.0517)

-0.0978**
(0.0457)

-0.854***
(0.166)

-0.0366
(0.297)

-0.289
(0.265)

-0.280***
(0.0324)

-0.0213
(0.0401)

-0.0372
(0.0357)

0.306***
(0.0730)

0.0204
(0.113)

-0.000396
(0.0984)

0.383***
(0.0258)

0.223***
(0.0332)

0.0222
(0.0295)

0.180
(0.115)

-0.429***
(0.159)

-0.376***
(0.141)

0.280
(0.337)

-0.153
(0.604)

0.671
(0.539)

0.626*
(0.330)

-0.0475
(0.592)

0.547
(0.528)
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Joint and Several
Liability 2

Joint and Several
Liability 1

-0.00679
(0.0705)

-0.0472
(0.0881)

0.0882
(0.0783)

-0.186***
(0.0251)

-0.0898***
(0.0312)

0.0121
(0.0274)

Notes: Table reports the coefficients for the linear regression of the impact of each law
reform variable on either total allocated loss, economic loss, or noneconomic loss. Each
cell within the table above represents a different regression. Each of the regressions also
includes controls for the other law reform variables, year, policy type, and injury type.
The standard error of each coefficient estimate is presented in the parentheses below. The
asterix specifies the level of significance (* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%).
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Table 6. Regression Summary Table Using Individual Laws in Regressions

Law Names
Caps on
Noneconomic
Damages (Medical
Liability) 1, Caps on
Noneconomic
Damages (Medical
Liability) 2, Periodic
Payments (Medical
Liability)

Caps on Punitive
Damages 2, Punitive
Damages (Evidence)
2

Caps on Punitive
Damages 1, Punitive
Damages Evidence 1

Caps on Punitive
Damages (Deceptive
Trade Practice,
Product Liability),
Comparative Fault

Caps on Total
Damages (Medical
Liability, Non
Wrongful Death
Claims)

Caps on Total
Damages (Medical
Liability, Wrongful
Death)

Joint and Several
Liability 4

Joint and Several
Liability 3

Total Allocated Loss

Regression Type
Economic Loss

Noneconomic Loss

-0.345***
(0.00789)

-0.0422***
(0.0148)

-0.0288**
(0.0128)

-0.262***
(0.00695)

-0.0154
(0.0108)

-0.0229**
(0.00912)

0.0185***
(0.00555)

-0.0453***
(0.00781)

0.00806
(0.00661)

0.0734
(0.0469)

-0.193**
(0.0847)

-0.182**
(0.0715)

0.677***
(0.0161)

0.233***
(0.0207)

0.00492
(0.0179)

0.0283
(0.0714)

-0.378***
(0.116)

-0.362***
(0.0995)

-1.004***
(0.0234)

-0.130***
(0.0438)

-0.0657*
(0.0380)

-0.128***

0.000477

-0.0244
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Joint and Several
Liability 2

Joint and Several
Liability 1

(0.0121)

(0.0194)

(0.0164)

-0.155***
(0.00988)

-0.0954***
(0.0144)

0.00722
(0.0122)

0.329***
(0.0181)

0.0828***
(0.0219)

0.000475
(0.0195)

Notes: Table reports the coefficients for the linear regression of the impact of each law
reform variable on either total allocated loss, economic loss, or noneconomic loss. Each
cell within the table above represents a different regression. Each of the regressions also
includes controls for year, policy type, and injury type. The standard error of each
coefficient estimate is presented in the parentheses below. The asterix specifies the level
of significance (* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%).
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Table 7. Policy Type Regressions

Law Names
Caps on
Noneconomic
Damages (Medical
Liability) 1, Caps on
Noneconomic
Damages (Medical
Liability) 2, Periodic
Payments (Medical
Liability)

Monoline
general
liability

Commercial
auto liability

Texas
Commercial
multiperil

Medical
professional
liability

Other
professional
liability

-0.196***
(0.0564)

-0.348***
(0.0685)

-0.153**
(0.0610)

-0.211**
(0.0861)

-0.597*
(0.338)

-1.227***
(0.242)

-1.332***
(0.427)

-0.562*
(0.331)

-0.505
(0.489)

-0.343**
(0.166)

-0.438***
(0.0617)

-0.326***
(0.0721)

-0.207***
(0.0513)

-0.280***
(0.0745)

-0.299
(0.320)

Caps on Punitive
Damages (Deceptive
Trade Practice,
Product Liability),
Comparative Fault

-2.580**
(1.127)

0.134
(0.129)

0.251***
(0.0911)

0.765***
(0.218)

1.470**
(0.595)

Caps on Total
Damages (Medical
Liability, Non
Wrongful Death
Claims)

0.706***
(0.0479)

0.180***
(0.0607)

0.146***
(0.0416)

0.403***
(0.0600)

0.791***
(0.273)

4.525***
(1.602)

0.277*
(0.161)

0.0670
(0.160)

0.891***
(0.308)

-1.628
(1.014)

0.136
(0.490)

1.468*
(0.862)

0.200
(0.675)

-0.656
(0.994)

0.438
(0.780)

0.659

1.650*

0.470

-0.363

Caps on Punitive
Damages 2, Punitive
Damages (Evidence)
2

Caps on Punitive
Damages 1, Punitive
Damages Evidence 1

Caps on Total
Damages (Medical
Liability, Wrongful
Death)

Joint and Several
Liability 4

Joint and Several
Liability 3
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Joint and Several
Liability 2

Joint and Several
Liability 1

(0.479)

(0.852)

(0.661)

(0.975)

-0.119
(0.136)

0.0553
(0.156)

-0.118
(0.111)

-0.172
(0.164)

0.531
(0.705)

-0.439***
(0.0564)

-0.269***
(0.0470)

-0.144***
(0.0385)

-0.342***
(0.0609)

-0.00640
(0.221)

Notes: Table reports the coefficients for the linear regression of the impact of each law
reform variable on the total allocated loss within each of the five policy types. Each cell
within the table above represents a different regression. Each of the regressions also
includes controls for the other law reform variables, year, policy type, and injury type.
The standard error of each coefficient estimate is presented in the parentheses below. The
asterix specifies the level of significance (* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%).
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